The feminism she embraces has five key dimensions: (1) an internationalism so that it is not limited to a particular culture; (2) a humanism that affirms the fundamental equality of all human beings and promotes justice for all; (3) a commitment to liberalism as a perspective that best protects and promotes the “fundamental human capacities of choice and reason” that make all human beings equal; (4) sensitivity to the cultural formation of our preferences and desires; and (5) an effort to achieve gender understanding. He expresses an appreciation for the primary goods that form the core of Rawls` theory, while asserting that his analysis does not go far enough. All these skills are essential to our functioning as a prosperous people and should be provided to all citizens of a just society. But historically, women have been and continue to be neglected and should receive their protection in the name of justice (Sex, pp. 24, 6-14, 34, 40-42). Former employees visited almost every week. If more than a year had passed since their last visit, the judiciary would reprimand them for staying away for too long. Between visits, she kept her life informed through correspondence and phone calls. Every time you had a baby, she would send a little t-shirt that read “O`Connor Grandclerk.” Mill acknowledges that concern about a possible conflict between utility and justice has always been “one of the strongest obstacles” to the acceptance of utilitarianism. If the permanent enslavement of a minority could produce overwhelming happiness for a majority (he was personally opposed to slavery as a ruthless violation of human freedom), then, given that utility is the value that trumps all others, why shouldn`t the injustice of slavery be accepted as a (unfortunately) necessary means to a socially desirable end? The first, regrettable as it is, is so justified? Mill believes that the key to solving this supposed problem is conceptual analysis, that if we understand well what “utility” and “justice” are, we will be able to see that no real conflict between them is possible. We have already understood what the first concept means and now we need to explain the second.
Mill sets out five dimensions of justice when we use the term: (1) respect for the “legal rights” of others is considered just, while their violation is unjust; (2) respecting the “moral right” one has over something is just, while it is unfair to violate it; (3) it is considered right to give a person what he “deserves” and unfair to refuse it; (4) It is considered unfair to “break the faith” with another when it is right to keep faith in others; and (5) in certain circumstances, it is considered unfair to be “biased” in one`s judgments and simply to be impartial. People generally associate all of this with justice, and they seem to represent legitimate aspects of virtue. (Interestingly, Mill rejects the idea of “equality” as essential to our understanding of justice, a view that would be problematic for Marxists.) While searching for his own common denominator for these different dimensions of justice, he notes that justice always goes beyond general good and evil and includes what “only one of us can claim as his moral right.” This includes the legitimate feeling that anyone who has committed injustice deserves to be punished in some way (which is related to Kant). Mill believes it all boils down to the idea that justice is a term “for certain moral requirements that collectively are higher on the scale of social benefit than anyone else.” But this means that justice, properly understood, is a name for the most important of “social benefits” (ibid., pp. 296-301, 305, 309, 320-321). Therefore, there can supposedly be no real conflict between utility and justice. If there were circumstances in which slavery was truly beneficial to humanity, that would probably be fair; The reason it`s (usually) unfair is because it goes against utility. The main objective is to reduce justice to social benefit, so that, by definition, any ultimate conflict between the two is excluded. The social role that our sense of justice plays is supposed to serve the common good. If she really is the wise Latina she seems to think, she probably wishes she had never uttered those words, because they give her political opponents a very exploitable angle of attack that they would not otherwise have.
And she will have the somewhat awkward position of explaining what that meant to the predominantly white men in the Senate who will vote on her confirmation. Let us now see how Aristotle applies his own theory of justice to the social problem of the so-called superiors and subordinates before attempting a brief critique of this theory. While Plato accepted slavery as a legitimate social institution but advocated equal opportunities for women, Aristotle in his politics accepted sexual inequality and actively defended slavery. Whoever is intellectually and morally inferior is socio-politically inferior in a well-ordered polis. A human being may or may not be autonomous by nature, with a “natural slave” deficient in rationality and morality and therefore intrinsically fit to belong to a superior; Such a person may properly be considered “property” or a “tool of action” of another person. Given natural human inequality, it is supposedly inappropriate for all to govern or share domination. Aristotle argues that some are considered superior and fit to rule from birth, while others are inferior and marked from birth to be ruled by others. This is supposed to be true not only of ethnic groups but also of gender, and he unequivocally asserts that men are “inherently superior” and that women are “inferior by nature,” with the former capable of governing and the latter being governable. The claim is that it is naturally preferable for women themselves to be ruled by men, just as it is preferable for “natural slaves” to be ruled by those who are “free by nature.” Now, Aristotle only argues for natural slavery. It was customary in ancient times (note the distinction used here between custom and nature) to turn conquered enemies into slaves who became prisoners of war.
But Aristotle (like Plato) believes that Greeks are born for free and rational self-management, unlike non-Greeks (“barbarians”), who are inferior and incapable of doing so by nature. Thus, the fact that a person is defeated or captured is not a guarantee that he is fit for slavery, since an unjust war may have been imposed on a nobler society by a more primitive society. While Aristotle admits that Greeks and non-Greeks, as well as men and women, are all real human beings, he justifies the alleged inequality between them on the basis of what he calls the “counseling” capacity of their rational souls. The rational soul of the natural slave is supposed to lack it, a woman has it, but does not have the authority to be autonomous, a child (free male) has it at a stage of development, and a naturally superior free man has developed it and made it available to the government (ibid., pp.